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Migration: the last frontier? 




In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the foundations of the global order which Euro-
Americans have come to take for granted – such that they regard their position of socio-
economic privilege as both institutionally and ideologically normative – have become 
alarmingly unstable. All manner of negative portents which have lurked below the horizon 
have suddenly sprung to the forefront in the aftermath of the collapse of the latest and largest 
of the speculative bubbles which that orders has yet generated. But if we look beyond the 
chaotic the consequences of the current credit crunch, there are good reasons to believe that it 
presages a fundamental shift in the tectonics of the global socio-political order, and of of a 
kind which can only be fully understood viewed in the longue durée.  
 
Five centuries ago Iberian skills in seamanship, conveniently combined with a commitment 
to naval warfare and access to the products of the silver mines of Potosí, enabled armed, 
state-promoted European merchants to find their way round the Cape of Good Hope, and to 
barge their way into a well-established arena of intercontinental trade: that which connected a 
network of ports – and hence the empires which stood behind them – lying around the 
periphery of the Indian Ocean and the eastern Pacific, and which had been going strong for 
the best part of two millennia. Although Europeans subsequently came to regard their 
achievements as a necessary triumph, the early adventurers actually found themselves faced 
with challenges with which they were ill-equipped to cope. The Indian Ocean and its adjuncts 
formed a highly sophisticated mercantile arena, and although its markets were filled with all 
manner of products for which there was an insatiable demand in back home, the interlopers 
initially had little if anything to offer in exchange: the manufacturing capabilities of the 
inhabitants of Asia’s backward western promontory were comprehensively inferior to those 
in India and China (Chaudhuri 1983, Gordon 2008). 
 
How, then, did the interlopers manage to pull it off? Perhaps their most vital initial asset was 
their skills in naval warfare, together with their willingness to deploy their weaponry to assert 
themselves over those whom they routinely dismissed as godless heathens. When Portuguese 
privateers rounded the Cape of Good Hope at the beginning of the sixteenth century they 
found themselves in the midst of a thriving arena of long distance seaborne trade, based on 
the mutual exchange of sought-after goods. But as Pearson (1976) describes in some detail, 
whilst the Portuguese little to offer in the way of peaceful exchange for the goods they 
sought, they not only had the weaponry to implement forced exchanges on their own terms, 
but to impose substantial taxes, in the form of the compulsory cartaze system on all local 
seaborne trade.  It is by no means clear for how long the Empires of India and China would 
have put up with such piratical tactics, but in the event the Europeans found a means of 
reverting to more normal forms of trade – although this was still exercised under the shadow 
of their naval might. 
 
Thanks to their success in overthrowing the civilizations of the ‘New World’ on the far side 
of the Atlantic, Europe gained access to the almost the limitless wealth of the silver mines of 
Potosí – or in other words to what André Gunder Frank (1998) has aptly described as ‘Free 
Money’. This proved to be crucial. Given access to the mineral (and later the agricultural) 
resources of the Americas, together with their willingness to deploy non-European labour on 
a ruthless basis as they set about exploiting them, state-supported adventurers Spain, 
England, France and Holland joined the Portuguese in developing sea-borne global networks 
on the basis of which they could deploy New World bullion to facilitate the purchase Indian 
and Chinese manufactures the East, and subsequently to mechanise those manufacturing 
techniques to generate an Industrial Revolution in Western Europe, and shortly awards in 
North America. In doing so they managed to shift centre of gravity of the global economy 
gradually westwards. As a result Euro-America experienced a huge burst of economic growth 
during the course of nineteenth century, and Asia an equally rapid period of decline, thus 
producing a global imperial structure which reached its apogee in the opening years of the 
twentieth century (Darwin 2000). It is precisely that structure which appears be facing its 
nemesis at the beginning of the twenty first.  
 
However my aim in this paper is not produce an essay on global systems. My concern here is 
much more limited: to explore the role of diasporas, and most especially with those which 
have emerged ‘from below’, in the midst of these dramatic patterns of change.  Moreover I 
write as an anthropologist, rather than as political economist or a systems theorist, and hence 
with as much of an interest in the minutiae of face-to-face social interactions can nevertheless 
be extended into global networks, so enabling relatively powerless actors not just to 
manoeuvre their way through the multiplicity of socio-economic arenas, but also to 
significantly re-order their very structures as they do so. This was not, however, the 
destination which I expected to reach when I initially set out, the best part of forty years ago, 
to use ethnographic methods to explores the patterns of adjustment displayed by South Asian 
migrant workers as the established themselves in Britain’s industrial cities. As I did so I 
found my agenda steadily widening to reach the position set out in this essay: an exploration 
the dynamics social, cultural, economic and spatial trajectories followed by South Asian 
migrant workers  as they have developed innumerable entrepreneurially oriented networks of 
transnational mutual reciprocity to press their way upwards and outwards through the post-
Imperial global order. Hence whilst my empirical starting point was that of a micro-focused 
ethnographer working in a single locality, I soon discovered that my initial agenda was 
ridiculously restricted: local developments were best understood as a narrow parochial corner 
globally extended trans-jurisdictional diasporic network. In seeking to understand the 
dynamics of totality of developments within that arena, it became steadily more apparent that 
my investigations should be extended to all possible levels of social analysis: from marriage 
rules and their impact on the dynamics of interpersonal relationships at one end of the scale, 
right through the historical dynamics of global imperialism at the other. 
 
Moreover I soon began to appreciate there was no way in which I could complete my analysis 
by focusing solely the activities South Asian diasporic entrepreneurs. Even though the great 
majority emerged from humble beginnings, and hence very firmly ‘from below’ (Smith and 
Guarnizo 1998), their activities at all times had a transgressive dimension. In the process of 
pursuing their own self-defined interests and concerns in the midst of a global order, they 
were routinely perceived as making unwelcome challenges to the interests of the indigenes 
amongst whom they settled, such that their initiatives were constantly in danger of be 
categorised as illegitimate.  The dynamics which diasporas precipitate are no less external 
than internal, so much so that no coherent analytical progress can be made this sphere without 
giving careful consideration to the dialectical processes of reaction and counter-reaction to 
which such initiatives give rise.  
 
Several points follow from this. Firstly all such investigations must be glocal in character, as 
Gardener (1995) emphases in her aptly titled monograph Global Migrants, Local Lives. 
Secondly, and consequently, research in this arena is ill-suited to disciplinary myopia. Not 
only do personal and domestic developments constantly interact with economic and political 
developments in the world at large, also one in which one has to keep a constant eye on the 
longue durée. To paraphrase Marx (1852) 
Migrants make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it 
under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and 
transmitted from the past  
The internal dynamics of translocal networks  
Nevertheless the vast majority of contemporary migrants differ strikingly in their outlook 
from that envisioned by Marx when he went on to suggest that  
the great mass of the French nation is formed by the simple addition of homologous 
magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes ….  Insofar as there is merely 
a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests 
forms no community, no national bond, and no political organization among them …. they are 
incapable of asserting their class interest in their own name.  
I quote Marx here not so much to suggest that Marx’s analytical conclusions with respect to 
the state of the French nation in the mid-nineteenth century were analytically correct (indeed 
I suspect they were profoundly mistaken) but rather to emphasise that the vast majority of 
migrants were and are in no sense ‘potatoes’ in Marx’s sense. They rarely, if ever, acted as 
individuals: instead they invariably so as part and parcel of self-constructed spatially 
extended networks of inter-personal reciprocity, through which they seek to leap-frog their 
way to better and more prosperous futures in distant lands.  
 
What, then, do these networks consist of? And how do they sustain themselves? 
 
Inter-personal relationships are the ultimate foundation of every social order; and in whatever 
context they occur, and whatever purposed they serve, such interconnections can readily be 
mapped out as networks. However the networks with which we are am concerned here have a 
further distinctive characteristic: they are spatially extended, and must somehow serve to 
maintain such inter-personal relationships, even though those involved are precluded from 
engaging in face-to-face interactions with one another on a day to day basis. It also follows 
that whatever the scale of such linkages – whether as between virilocal wives and their now 
distant natal kinsfolk, as between charismatic ‘saints’ and their spatially scattered devotees, 
as between merchants engaged in long distance trade, or migrants within a global diaspora – 
similar strategic requirements must be fulfilled if the resulting networks are to be more than a 
flash in the pan. If they are to sustain themselves over time, networks members must be 
prepared (and able to make) a substantial investment in mutual communication as between 
themselves. If such networks are not to fall into abeyance, patterns of mutual reciprocity must 
regularly be renewed. It is also worth noting that whilst trans-local networks of kind are 
nothing new, recent developments in communications technology, especially in the form of 
the internet and the even more ubiquitous mobile phone, have radically eased greatly eased 
the technical challenges which have always been inherent in the maintenance of such 
networks. But whilst the investment which members are prepared in network-maintenance is  
usually directly proportional to the level of the benefits (in the longer no less than the shorter 
term) which they estimate they can gain from participating in such networks, the benefits 
which they envisage can be immensely varied in character. Hence although these are 
invariably strongly material in character, they are equally invariably further conditioned by 
moral, emotional, religious and political considerations, as well as those of prestige. Hence 
whilst the patterns of reciprocity which underpin such networks lead to broadly equivalent in 
value (for otherwise the losers would drop out), they are by no means necessarily equivalent 
in kind, or simultaneous in time.  
 
Issues of power 
All such networks raise issues of power. As well as empowering their members (for network-
formation by definition enables those involved to pursue goals with greater success than 
would have been able to do as autonomous, and hence as non-cooperating, individuals), they 
are further conditioned by the character of the context from which they emerge, as well as 
those into which they thrust themselves. From this perspective trans-local initiatives can 
conveniently be grouped into two broad categories: those which emerge transgressively ‘from 
below’, and those which descend hegemonically ‘from above’. This opens up a further 
dimension of my argument. However striking and significant diasporic networks ‘from 
below’ may be, they are by no means the only networking show in town. In the context of the 
global arena they are paralleled by – and indeed have in large part emerged in 
contradistinction to – a further set of networks which have emerged as it were from the other 
side of the fence: those operating ‘from above’, and which facilitated the growth of – and 
which continue to sustain – the hegemonic commercial and political networks by means of 
which the Euro-American gained their now-imperilled condition of global hegemony.  
 
Close inspection also reveals that there is a powerful sense in which the two contrapuntal 
strategies mirror one another. Whilst the diasporic initiatives with which we are concerned 
here develop as countervailing responses to those which have emerged hegemonically from 
above during the course of the past four centuries, all such initiatives, whether emanating 
from below or above, where ultimately underpinned by the same objectives: to facilitate the 
global circulation of personnel, capital and information the better to advance the collective 
interests of their members – transgressively of hegemonically as the case may be.  
Empires, Empire and the currently emergent post-Imperial global order 
Viewed from the longue durée, this dialectic also takes us back to a period in world history 
when roles were reversed as compared which have prevailed for the past two centuries. 
Having achieved the capacity to circumnavigate the globe in their heavily armed galleons, the 
transgressive success of ruthless state-supported European merchant adventurers ultimately 
precipitated to a spectacular restructuring of the world order: building on each others’ prior 
achievements, the Portuguese, Spanish, the Dutch, the British and ultimately the Americans 
established imperial systems with an increasingly global reach. Not that empire was in any 
sense a novel phenomenon: in the seventeenth century the Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal and 
Ch’ing Empires vastly outclassed the relatively puny nation states of Western Europe in size, 
sophistication and historical depth. What was new was the unprecedented capacity of these 
adventurers drawn firmly ‘from below’ (as the world was then structured) to operate on a 
truly global scale – and their consequent ability to use the wealth looted from the Americas to 
finance their entrepreneurial activities in Southern and Eastern Asia. To be sure for several 
centuries their power was limited to their control of the sea ways, and to a string of otherwise 
isolated ports, but their transgressive activities ultimately built up such a momentum that they 
were able to undermine, and eventually to impose their hegemony over, their less initially 
substantially more wealthy and sophisticated Asiatic imperial predecessors.  
 
Not that those who implemented this first round of globalisation were the inventors of long-
distance navigation or of transnational entrepreneurship. All the major Asiatic civilizations 
had been in touch with one another for many centuries prior to the arrival of European 
interlopers; trade between them was extensive, and there is now a growing body of evidence 
indicating that parts of Admiral He’s fleet circumnavigated the globe a full century before 
Magellan achieved the same feat (Menzies 2002). Nevertheless there was one highly 
distinctive feature about the way in which the Europeans exploited opportunities to conduct 
arbitrage on a global scale: their willingness to ruthless use violence to get their own way 
whenever and wherever they found themselves in a position to so. As a result they managed 
to exploit their position as first-comers to maritime globalisation with extraordinary success. 
By the time this process reached its apogee at beginning of the 20th century Euro-America 
had long since ceased to be transgressive interlopers ‘from below’. The level of global 
hegemony which they had reached by deploying these tactics was so comprehensive that 
those responsible took their position so much for granted that they were utterly confident of 
both the legitimacy and the inevitability of their status of lords and masters of the world 
order. It is easy to see why they reached this hubristic conclusion. With few exceptions1, all 
other imperial structures had by then been swept away, and the greater part of the indigenous 
population of the remainder of the world had been over-run by military force. Hence it was 
easy for Europeans to conclude that the conceptual, philosophical, literary, artistic, scientific, 
and technological achievements of all other components of humankind were intrinsically 
inferior to their own.  
 
This precipitated a trope which rapidly became institutionalised throughout the Euro-
American world. The dramatic disparity in wealth and power between Europeans and all 
others, which continued to widen through the first half of the twentieth century, could readily 
be explained – or so it was presumed – in terms of a combination of cultural and biological 
arguments: whilst ‘we’ were civilised, and biologically endowed with capability to develop 
advanced civilisation, ‘they’ were not. Europe’s imperial successes were therefore entirely 
legitimate, and a manifestation of the evolutionary process of natural selection. 
**** 
Of course in contemporary Euro-America the explicit articulation of such racialistic 
sentiments has long since gone out of fashion, especially in intellectually sophisticated 
contexts. Nevertheless it would be idle to suggest that such sentiments have disappeared from 
popular culture in any corner of Euro-America, or that ‘popular culture’ in this sense is a 
phenomenon solely limited to the ill-educated. From an ethnographic perspective popular 
culture is best understood as the sum total of the conceptual premises – polite or otherwise – 
which are routinely deployed in the course of their everyday activities by members of the 
population in question. For those operating within such a framework its conceptual 
lineaments are hard to perceive, since they grounded unspoken as well as unspoken values 
and assumptions which appear to be no more than ‘commonsense’ to their users. That this 
should be so should come as no surprise. Whilst global empire is an inescapable component 
of European history in general, and of English history in particular, active remembrance of 
                                                 
1  One of which was the annihilation of the Russian Pacific Fleet by the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1905 
– a clear harbinger for the future, at least for those whose eyes were not blinded by hubristic myopia.  
what that process actually entailed is now regarded as so deeply embarrassing that it has been 
parked beyond the scope of respectable knowledge. But cultural traditions follow their own 
dynamics: so long as the premises and assumptions about their ‘natural’ position in the global 
order which have been articulated by Europeans – no less in their homelands than in their 
overseas diasporas – are not subject to explicit and unavoidable challenges, it should be a 
source of little surprise that historically grounded conceptual assumptions should remains as 
well-established as ever in popular culture, so much so that Euro-Americans have found 
themselves able to live out their lives through the course of the twentieth century as if nothing 
had changed (see Ballard and Parveen 2008). 
  
Once again it is easy to see why. Whilst formal control of their imperial possessions vanished 
by the middle of the century, on-going processes of globalisation still continued to deliver the 
goods. At least until the onset of the credit crunch, their mean standard of living continued to 
rise, and the prospect of nemesis was systematically ignored.  
Global re-orientation in the new millennium  
It seems most unlikely that those who have gained so many benefits from Europe’s processes 
of diasporic expansion will be able to sustain such hubristic expectations for very much 
longer, given the position of unchallenged global hegemony which they have so long enjoyed 
now seems perilously close to nemesis. But as a process of global reorientation begins to 
unroll before our eyes, there is little sign that the challenger from below are merely playing 
‘catch up’ with Euro-America, as development theory once so naively assumed. Rather they 
are doing so by out-manoeuvring and hence by-passing their former hegemons, above all by 
thinking for themselves.  
 
Regardless of the presumptions of their hegemons, most of those subject to colonial 
dominance were always been deeply sceptical of suggestions that the only route to progress 
was by aping the manners and assumptions of their ‘betters’. To be sure members of 
assimilated elites whom the hegemons had so carefully trained to act as their agents may 
sometimes have been taken in by such fantasies; however far more – and most especially 
allegedly ‘backward’ and ‘ill-educated’ peasants – have long been aware of the hypocrisy of 
such arguments, not least because the more local hegemons who had long ruled over them 
regularly deployed just the same tactics as a means of defending and legitimising their 
positions of aristocratic privilege. 
 Deeply distrustful of the manoeuvres of elites of all kind, the history and traditions of South 
Asia’s peasant taught them the best route to survival was by looking to their own for mutual 
support. Closing ranks on that basis (most usually by a combination o caste and kinship) they 
sought to make most of whatever resources they could lay their  hands on the better to pull 
themselves up by their own collective bootstraps. In doing so they relied on four closely 
inter-related assumptions:  
i. Always to be sceptical of the motives outsiders, and most especially of agents of the 
state. On the basis of many generations of experience, it is assumed that other things 
being equal, ‘outsiders’ are most unlikely to have the best interests of people like 
themselves at heart: on the contrary they are much more likely to rip them off.  
ii. Always be aware that the world large is not only hierarchically ordered, but inherently 
competitive character. Autonomy should always be one’s goal, since competitive 
others are always likely to be trying to manoeuvre them into a position of political, 
social, and economic dependency – condition which should be avoided like the 
plague. 
iii. That the socio-economic order has the character of a zero-sum game: hence any 
advances one makes oneself are likely to transgress on the interests of others, and of 
course vice-versa. Hence it is self-evident that the best way to move forward is to 
close ranks in mutual solidarity, not least because it stands to reason that one’s rivals 
will already be pursuing just the same tactics. 
iv.  If survival, let alone significant and sustainable progress, can only be made on a 
collective basis, it follows that windfalls are unlikely to arrive overnight. Peasants 
calculate their income from harvest to harvest, and beyond that from generation. 
Hence they are prepared to wait for their initiatives to mature.  
The application of this logic – whose premises are also widely shared by traditionally minded 
merchants, but which are equally foreign to those with generations of exposure to waged 
employment, and/or to the seductive of credit-driven capitalism – provides an illuminating 
basis for comprehending current developments in the global socio-economic order. Those 
socialised into such a peasant logic tend not only to be strongly entrepreneurially minded, but 
to be equally aware of the strategic advantages of maintaining a position of autonomy and 
independence vis-à-vis outsiders of all kinds. Hence they much prefer to work for themselves 
than to be wage-slaves for others, and to avoid debt like the plague. However this certainly 
does not mean that they operate as radical individualists: rather they are acutely aware of the 
strategic value of reciprocity and mutual cooperation – but only within the context of the 
networks of trust available within their own self-constructed networks of mutual reciprocity. 
But in a remarkable paradox, the nominally parochial character of such networks is proving 
to be highly adaptive in the shrunken but highly competitive world of contemporary 
globalisation: because they are readily translocally extendible, such networks actively 
facilitate ground-breaking forms entrepreneurially-motivated diasporic expansion.  
The transgressive consequences of reverse colonisation 
For several centuries after 1492 Western European activities in the remainder of the globe 
were essentially predatory. But for a few exceptions, such as along the length of the 
temperate Atlantic seaboard of North America, residential colony-construction was 
eschewed: instead the primary purpose of imperial policy was to maximise the transfer of 
wealth back to Western Europe. Only after several centuries of predatory accumulation – 
which served amongst other things to provide the capital with which to finance the industrial 
revolution – did mass settlement of the allegedly empty terra nullius of the New World take 
off, reaching its apogee towards the end of the nineteenth century. But whilst the vast 
majority of these settlers were also of rural origin, their situation differed in several 
significant ways from their contemporary European successors. In the first place they arrived 
with the might of empire behind them: hence even though the vast majority of the millions of 
immigrants who passed through the facilities on Ellis Island were poverty stricken, vis-à-vis 
the indigenous population of North America whose land they were about to seize such settlers 
were manifestly operating primarily ‘from above’.  
 
But if mass outward migration from Western Europe trickled to a halt during the first half of 
the twentieth century, it has since been comprehensively reversed, and in a manner which 
currently appears to be unstoppable. Despite the ever more desperate efforts of virtually all 
recipient states throughout the developed world to contain and control what is now widely 
perceived as an incoming flood, as well to halt the equally transgressive growth of the 
thriving non-European ethnic colonies within their borders, have proved nugatory. Hence 
despite the introduction of ever more draconian measures aimed at protecting the borders, and 
hence the prosperity, of the affluent North, the self-constructed initiatives of migrant workers 
emanating from the South have generated a process of reverse colonisation ‘from below’ 
whose dynamics are proving to be unstoppable.  
 
Paradoxically enough, one of the central reasons for the interlopers’ initial success has been a 
straightforward consequence of affluence. The more the northern indigenes began to take 
their comfortable lifestyles for granted, the more reluctant they have become to engage in 
hard, uncomfortable and menial forms of physical labour. Hence even though recent 
development have led to the transfer of a huge range of manufacturing activity from Euro-
America to East and South Asia as part and parcel of yet another dimension of successful 
transgressive entrepreneurship from below, the prosperous economies of the North have been 
left with an irreducible bedrock of tasks which it is infeasible either to mechanise or to 
export. These include the harvesting of agricultural produce, basic tasks in building and 
construction, provision of personal care to the elderly, the sick and the infirm, and a whole 
swathe of further services from catering through cleaning to the provision of overnight 
security. Not only is the demand for personnel in this sector of the labour market growing 
inexorably throughout the affluent world, but the wages and conditions of service associated 
with these jobs are now so poor that they no longer attract the now-affluent indigenes. Hence 
despite rising levels of indigenous unemployment in most parts of the affluent world, 
wherever one chooses to look all manner of essential tasks are routinely performed by 
migrant workers.  
 
Reactions of the indigenes to their presence have varied over time. During periods of rapid 
economic expansion there was little opposition to their arrival, providing that they filled 
otherwise unfillable vacancies, and offered no significant competitive threat to the interests of 
the established population. However the moment these conditions ceased to be fulfilled, as 
was inevitably the case as soon as the settlers began to try to move upwards and outward, 
and/or because recession set in, hostility to their presence began sharply, so much so that it 
has now become endemic. As popular pressure mounted, all manner of legislative initiatives 
began to be introduced, firstly to curb the ability of such newcomers to gain access to 
citizenship, and subsequently efforts to prevent the entry of settlers from this source at all by 
means of the introduction of ever more draconian immigration controls2. Not that border 
controls of this sort brought further immigrations to a halt, not least because the demand for 
hands to perform all manner of menial tasks at the bottom of the labour market remained as 
great as ever. Instead processes of so-called ‘people smuggling’ developed to enable those 
eager to take such jobs to evade the barriers of immigration control designed to prevent them 
from gaining access to them. As a result a significant proportion of the labour force 
throughout the developed world is composed of workers variously identified as ‘illegal’, 
                                                 
2  Given their status as subjects of the (British) Crown, until the passage of the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigration Act migrants from South Asia, like all other Commonwealth citizens, gained just the same 
nominal civil status as members of the indigenous population the moment they stepped ashore in the 
UK. Those rights have since been steadily stripped away, and disappeared entirely with the passage of 
the 1981 British Nationality Act.  
‘undocumented, ‘sans-papiers’ whose presence is deemed to be illegitimate even though they 
fulfil a vital role in the local economy.  
 
However if we reverse our perspective and examine these developments from below rather 
than from above, such new found systems of border controls appear in a very diffident guise: 
as yet another of the obstacles which entrepreneurs from below have to find some way of 
evading or circumventing as they press their way transgressively upwards from the bottom. It 
follows that from perspective by far the most effective basis on which to engage in what 
those viewing their activities from above are all too willing to dismiss as ‘people smuggling’ 
is to utilise their transnational networking capabilities to facilitate the transfer of their 
kinsfolk through, around or beneath the border controls which have become such a salient 
feature of the contemporary global order, to incorporate the newcomers into the ubiquitous 
ethnic colonies which have sprung up on the far side of such barriers, and to facilitate their 
further upward mobility in their new environment.  
Global Networking – from above and below 
Having laid out this groundwork I am at long last in a position to revert to my core theme: 
that of global networking. Whist the phenomenon of globalisation has attracted an enormous 
amount of public and academic attention in recent years, virtually such discussions have 
taken the view that globalisation is in essence a top-down, neo-colonial phenomenon, by 
means of which Europe, and even more so the United States, has taken the opportunity to 
further reinforce its position of global hegemony. In a world in which the oil majors teamed 
up with the US military and the neo-cons in the Bush administration to pursue their joint 
objectives, the reality of their efforts to further buttress the Euro-American elite’s position of 
global hegemony privilege is (or at least was) undeniable. Nevertheless it has long been clear 
– at least to those whose eyes were blinkered by unilateral ideological presuppositions – that 
this was not the only game in town. A more objective view would suggest that countervailing 
forces had been gathering from below for at least a century, forcing one to ask some very 
serious questions. Could it be that the globally oriented neo-con adventures pursued with 
such enthusiasm by the Bush administration will prove with hindsight to be the last gasp of 
what had become a paper tiger, and marked the turning point in world history which the 
beneficiaries of the processes which were initially set in train as long ago as 1492 found 
themselves confronted at long last with the inevitability of nemesis?  
 
In material terms the consequences of the gathering force of globalisation from below are 
plain to see. India and China have regained their position as workshops of the world, and in 
doing so have displaced Euro-America from the position comprehensive superiority which it 
temporarily achieved as a result of developments which were set in train in the aftermath of 
1492. In the course of so doing the shallowness of the foundations on which the Bush 
administration launched its most recent global adventures were dramatically exposed. Over 
and above the extraordinary levels of personal debt and fiscal deficit which now serve to 
underpin the levels of affluence which US citizens (and indeed those of the UK) have come 
to expect, the US economy was also hugely imbalanced in external terms, since it required a 
daily inflow of $ 2 billion just to stay afloat, even before the current credit crunch set in. So 
far the US has been able to pull off its conjuring trick as a result of its fortunate position as 
worlds’ money-printer of last resort. But given that its economy is running on less than 
empty, it is unlikely to be able to sustain this confidence-trick for very much longer. Now that 
the masters of the universe on Wall Street have been comprehensively humiliated, and that 
most of the financial chips appear to be stacked up in the hands of China, Japan and the oil-
rich states of the Persian Gulf, the transgressive impact of globalisation from is plain to see.    
 
But what has this got do with transnational networks? Anthropologists do not normally 
ground their analyses in the context of a discussion of macro-economic developments. 
However I have done so here with good reason: there is no way in which the history, the 
dynamics or indeed the consequences of recent diasporic initiatives can be properly 
appreciated without taking careful cognisance of the longue durée within which they are set. 
There are two main reasons why this is so. Firstly large scale migratory movements, no less 
from below than above, have always played a salient role in all forms of globalisation: indeed 
there is a strong sense in which the two phenomena are coterminous; secondly, and just as 
importantly, processes of network-construction have always have been a far more significant 
feature in the implementation of these processes than is commonly appreciated. 
 
Nevertheless there are some sharp differences as between the two complementary exercises 
in trans-local network-construction are currently organised. Those articulated from above – 
whether in the form of multinational corporations, military expeditions or programs 
international assistance proffered by the World Bank or the IMF – are typically ordered on an 
impersonal, bureaucratic, contractual and hence a formal basis; by contrast the countervailing 
initiatives emanating from below are invariably ordered on a much more personal basis, such 
that relationships of kinship and mutual trust, together with solidarities of ethnicity, sect, 
clan, caste and so forth play a much more explicit role in network construction. In 
consequence the initiatives emanating from below tend to be much more personalised, and 
hence informal in character than are their bureaucratically and contractually ordered 
counterparts emanating from above.  
The dynamics of migrant networks 
If this model holds good, its implications could readily be explored within a far wider range 
of arenas than can be addressed in a single journal article. Hence my analytical focus in this 
context is primarily on migrant networks recently emerged from below, albeit with a constant 
awareness of the wider arenas within which these developments have been set. Meanwhile 
my empirical focus is on the myriad of transnational networks which have emerged from 
South Asia – or more accurately from a number of specific localities and communities in the 
subcontinent during the course of the past half-century.  
 
At one level any attempt to generalise about the growth of this global South Asian diaspora is 
a hopeless task. It is easy to see why: since those responsible for the construction of each 
highly localised component of the overall outflow have invariably developed their own 
distinctive elevator through which to implement the process of chain migration, such that the 
initial pioneers progressively enabled ever larger numbers of their kinsfolk to follow in the 
footsteps, there is an immense degree of variety in the destinations at which they touch 
ground, the character and income generating potential of the opportunities available at the 
specific points at which they did so, and in the size and character of the obstacles encountered 
by those on board in the process of doing so. Hence the speed with which traffic flows back 
and forth along each such escalator, as well as the degree of collective success enjoyed by 
those who travelled along it, varies enormously. But before considering the implications of 
the many underlying variables, as well as each set of migrants’ varied responses to the 
challenges they encountered, we must first consider the character of the escalators 
themselves.  
 
In the first place these structures are not just entrepreneurial in character, but self-constructed 
by their users. Contemporary migrants are relatively rarely directly recruited by their future 
employers: instead they invariably find – and self-finance – their way to their destinations. 
That is why kin-based chain migration plays such a salient role in the whole process: in each 
case pioneers are not just pathfinders, but routinely draw on the use overseas experience and 
earnings to facilitate the passage of their kinsfolk along the escalator, not least by providing 
them with the financial and documentary wherewithal to enable them to do so. Secondly, and 
just as importantly, few if any of these escalators remain a one-way street. Rather virtually all 
develop in such a way as to facilitate processes of transnational circulation – no less of ideas, 
information and material assets than of persons – as between all the various points around the 
globe at which they physically touch ground. As a result each such escalator (or set of 
escalators) establishes a web of inter-connections as between its home base and a range of 
distant colonies.  
 
It follows that the wider the range of locations in which any given network touches ground, 
the greater the opportunities for arbitrage will be opened up. By their very nature global 
networks – whether articulated from above or below – provide those involved with an 
opportunity to engage in global entrepreneurship. 
 
But just what do such networks consist of? Grounded in relationships of mutual reciprocity, 
such networks have no legal or corporate existence, and generate next to nothing in the way 
of formal documentation. But just like their more formal counterparts operating from above, 
they operate in trans-jurisdictional space (Ballard in press). However because they operate on 
an informal rather than a formal basis, they are also acutely vulnerable to politico-legal 
persecution. Precisely because they operate ‘outside the box’ their critics can readily label 
them as ‘secretive’ ‘underground’ ‘mafia’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ conspiracies whose principal 
objective is to undermine the established order. This tactic has been widely deployed with 
considerable enthusiasm in the aftermath of 9/11, since all such networks with a substantial 
Muslim component can readily be represented as having been constructed with the deliberate 
intention of facilitating criminal and/or terroristic activities. But even if it is the case that 
informal networks provide ideal targets around which to whip up moral panics, three 
underlying questions still need to be addressed: just what licit purposes can such networks 
potentially serve, just what is it about them that leads us to label them ‘informal’, and how 
and why is it that their very legitimacy remains so open to challenge?  
The strengths of reciprocity  
The answer to these three interconnected questions is not difficult to find: in a widespread but 
by now deeply ideologically ingrained Euro-American inability to comprehend how it is that 
substantial and stable social institutions can be constructed around relationships of mutual 
reciprocity, guaranteed and underpinned by that most intangible potential characteristic of 
human relationships, trust. By contrast contemporary Euro-Americans are much more 
individualistically minded, and deeply distrustful of mere trust as a reliable guarantor: hence 
they expect to make (and to receive) a written record of all their transactions, thereby 
rendering them contractual, and hence in principle enforceable in law. It follows that it is 
regarded as most unwise to enter into any transaction in the absence of a written record, and 
that all transactions made in the absence of such a record are regarded as ‘informal’ and 
hence inherently suspect. 
 
Not that trust is entirely absent from transactions which are nominally guaranteed solely by 
contract: there is no way in which formally constituted systems could possibly operate as 
smoothly as they do if contracts were regularly disputed in court. Instead legal proceedings 
are little more than a rarely used backstop, since partners to such contracts expect – and 
indeed trust – that the terms of the contract will be fulfilled without demur. In other words 
trust remains a crucial, if hidden, component of the whole edifice. If banks have stopped 
lending to each other, let alone to the customers, in the midst of the recent credit crunch it is 
not for lack of formal contractual instruments on the basis of which to make such deals. The 
system has frozen up because no-one can be confident that their normally reliable partners 
have not been holed below the waterline by the impact of hidden toxic debt.  
 
It follows that whilst banks – and indeed Euro-American institutions of all kinds – regularly 
play let’s pretend with formal contracts, no-one will actually sign one unless they trust the 
ability of the counterparty to fulfil its terms, institutions and organisations grounded in 
notions of reciprocity cut straight to the chase: unless one has established a prior relationship 
of trust with a prospective counterparty, a deal involving any kind of credit is unlikely to be 
done, since that would be regarded as far too risky. However in the context of a social arena 
where relationships between those involved are ordered in terms mutual reciprocity – as is the 
case as between members of translocal networks – deals which might otherwise have been 
regarded as dangerously risky can readily be implemented, on the grounds that the debtor will 
be subject to an intense moral obligation to return the favour as and when it is appropriate to 
do so. The translocal networks constructed by migrants as a means of facilitating their 
entrepreneurial initiatives are a classic example of arenas of this kind. Articulated around 
reciprocities of kinship, or failing that of quasi-kinship, otherwise parochial biraderi-based 
networks have been the driving forces behind the vast majority of South Asian diasporic 
initiatives.  
 
But if this is indeed the case, we also need to unpack the conceptual and organisational 
foundations around which such networks of reciprocity are constructed, as well as the extent 
to which the range and strength of the underlying bonds are further conditioned by further 
network-specific expectations and conventions.  
Ristedari  
From this perspective the kinship systems which best lend themselves to translocal, 
transnational, and indeed to trans-jurisdictional extension are those which give rise to 
strongly corporate extended families, and where such families are in turn located within 
strongly articulated networks patrilineal descent, and which a further reinforced and cross-cut 
by complementary ties of affinity generated by strategic marriage alliances: in other words 
precisely the kind of kinship system routinely deployed in many parts of the non-European 
world. But if kinship networks of this kind provide the foundation of the vast majority South 
Asian diasporic initiatives, the indigenous kinship conventions of Western Europe lie so far 
towards the opposite end of the spectrum of human kinship systems that those brought up 
within the context of a South Asian familial universe often doubt whether European 
onlookers have any notion of what they have in mind by ristedari3.  
 
It follows that when talking of family life, Euro-Americans and South Asians can be seen to 
inhabit entirely different behavioural and conceptual universes. As far as contemporary Euro-
Americans are concerned, it is ties of marriage rather than descent which lie at the heart of 
their favoured conceptualisation of what ‘the family’ is all about. For those familiar with no 
other conceptual universe, corporately structured extended families, together their attendant 
extensions into elaborately ordered patterns of reciprocity amongst both agnatic and affinal 
kinsfolk (or in other words the whole sphere of ristedari within which South Asians routinely 
operate) are quite literally beyond their ken.  
 
It also follows whilst the processes of diasporic expansion which emanated from Western 
Europe were no less conditioned by considerations of kinship than those currently being 
                                                 
3  For an extended discussion of the issues, see Ballard (2008)  
 
implemented by their South Asian counterparts, the resources of their underlying systems of 
kinship reciprocity available in each case differed radically. Hence whilst European settlers 
undoubtedly had, and made the most of, ‘strong families’ in a nuclear sense, their otherwise 
strongly articulated commitment to individualism did nothing to support the construction of 
cooperative, let alone corporate and kin-based initiatives as between nuclear families, or even 
collective initiatives stretching across several generations within a single family. In other 
words the cultural capital emigrants of European – and most especially of northern European 
– origin was ordered in such a way that their capacity for building extended networks of 
mutual reciprocity was relatively weak. 
 
But in the event this deficiency did not significantly inhibit their entrepreneurial success, 
especially when it came to re-peopling the plains of North America, the pampas of South 
America, or the South African veldt. When colonists arrived hegemonically from above they 
could rely on the colonial state to facilitate the marginalisation of the indigenous population, 
no matter how much they may have sought to resist the arrival of the transgressors. By 
contrast contemporary migrants pressing upwards from below enjoy no such luxury. Not only 
are the natives frequently just as hostile, especially when recession sets in, but in the context 
of majoritarian democracies they can readily ensure that legislation is passed to defend their 
parochial interests, even if for forms’ sake the exclusionary measures consequently 
introduced are hidden routinely hidden behind a smokescreen of commitments to anti-racism 
and the construction of a ‘a Just, Safe and Tolerant Society’4. If settlers find themselves 
facing an up-hill struggle in these circumstances, they also have to be intensely self-reliant – 
no less collectively than individually, if they are to make significant progress. Hence in a 
manner akin to – but frequently considerably more elaborate than – the strategies used by 
Sicilian (and many other Southern European) settlers in North America, their contemporary 
counterparts emanating from even further ‘below’ regularly draw upon their own distinctive 
cultural resources to create and maintain translocal networks of inter-personal reciprocity 
they better to transcend the obstacles with which they find themselves confronted. The well 
ordered kinship driven migratory escalators developed by some of the most diasporically-
successful groups a clear cut-example of the value, and indeed the effectiveness, of just this 
kind of initiative. It follows that there is nothing particularly ‘mysterious’ about these 
developments – other than that they draw on a source of cultural capital which beyond the 
                                                 
4  This phrase is to be found on all documents produced by the Home Office (the UK’s Ministry of the 
Interior), the lead agency for all issues in this sphere. 
experience of, and hence incomprehensible to, those trapped within the myopic limits of a 
narrowly Eurocentric experience.  
Value transfers within global networks 
At this point it is worth returning once again to the formal/informal distinction and its 
attendant consequences. But before doing so it is worth emphasising that is no part of my 
argument that formality is of necessity the foundation for the articulation of hegemonic 
initiatives from above, nor informality an intrinsic feature of transgressive activity from 
below – even if current global developments appear to manifest just such a correlation5. But 
despite the critical significance of this difference in the contemporary global order, there are 
nevertheless a remarkably wide range of parallels between the ways in which those using 
either methodology – whether deployed from above or below – set about reaching their 
respective strategic objectives.  
 
Most contemporary observers of globalisation, and especially those committed to exposing its 
‘evils’, point to transgressively trans-jurisdictional strategies of multi-national corporations as 
a cause for concern. As Baker (2006), Brittain-Catlin 2006) and many others have noted, 
such corporations, and most especially those which have gone offshore, owe a large part of 
their success, and above all their staggering profitability, to their ability to shift ideas, 
personnel, goods, assets (and hence the profits so generated) around the globe within the 
privacy of their own networks, hence rendering the full scope of their activities beyond the 
purview of nationally grounded authorities; and by operating in what Beck has described as a 
translegal arena, they have been able to 
systematically exploit the cooperative advantages and hidden niches of different 
national legal systems for purposes of expanding global business power (Beck 2006: 
72).  
In other words by constructing fomally constituted trans-jurisdictional networks on a global 
scale they have been able transcend nation boundaries in the process of maximising corporate 
advantage, not least because the bulk of their profits can be made to appear in convenient off-
shore locations were corporate taxation is set at levels close to zero. Besides being grounded 
in relationships of contract, such networks are also formal in yet another sense: each such 
                                                 
5  In my view this correlation is almost certainly a further longue durée consequence of post-1492 
developments, since these served to deliver those he carried a taken-for-granted commitment to 
individualism to a position of global hegemony.  
edifice is constructed in the light of strategic advice from expensive corporate lawyers whose 
task is to ensure that all aspects of the operation fall just on the right side of legitimacy. 
 
But if the essence of such corporate networks is to facilitate the global transfer of value to the 
advantage of its directors and shareholders, it is striking that the contemporary world’s 
innumerable diasporic escalators from below use exactly the same trans-jurisdictional 
strategies to advance their constructors’ collective interests. Moreover some of the most 
successful groups of all – such as the Gujarati Khojas, for example – have emulated the 
counterparts operating from above by moving offshore. As a result the centre of gravity of 
this Ismaili Muslim community has moved successively from its roots in Central Asia to the 
coast of Gujarat, then to British colonial East Africa and most recently to the west coast of 
North America, with a further range of smaller colonies scattered in all parts of the globe. 
Although their foundations are informal rather than formal, it follows that diasporic networks 
of this kind are no less transnational and trans-jurisdictional in character than are corporate 
entities such Exxon, Nokia and Microsoft.  
 
Nevertheless there are some equally striking differences between them. The diasporic 
networks which have been generated by migrant workers who have recently emerged from 
below may be far more numerous, but the capital assets held within them pale into 
insignificance alongside those of the average multinational corporation. Likewise the 
intrinsically licit character of formally constructed multi-national corporations places them in 
a position of immense strategic advantage in comparison with those engaged in developing 
involved in parallel initiatives ‘from below’. In so far as the corporate character of the latter 
is primarily grounded in informal, and hence invisible, ties of reciprocity, it can readily be 
suggested that in addition to having no formal legal status, further suspicion can be cast on all 
transactions amongst network members should also be regarded as intrinsically illicit, and 
indeed criminal, especially when they are implemented on a trans-jurisdictional arenas. By 
contrast formally constituted entities have no such problems: having instructed expensive 
corporate lawyers to ensure that all their operations can be represented as licit, multi-national 
corporations can readily establish a legal domicile behind door-plates in the Cayman Islands 
– or any other exotic location where taxes and regulatory imperatives impose minimal 
constraints on corporate profitability – to their own strategic advantage. By contrast when 
members of migrant networks seek to deploy similar strategies they can all too often find 
themselves subject to criminal prosecution.  
Transgression and its consequences 
Like all entrepreneurial activities, migration is a risky business. The travel agent’s deal could 
prove to be a rip off, the boat on which one is travelling could sink, one can be denied 
permission to cross any one of innumerable international borders, and having reached one’s 
desired destination one may well still be in danger of being thrown out for lack of appropriate 
documentation. But even if one can manage to establish a licit or semi-licit presence at one’s 
destination, many more hurdles still lie ahead. The job to which one had hoped to gain access 
may have evaporated of have been redefined, the pay can turn out to be far lower than 
expected, or a recession can suddenly set in, causing all such opportunities to disappear; the 
natives often prove to be far from friendly, especially when recession sets in; and just when 
one has begun to achieve one’s goals the overall political climate may change, such that one 
can find oneself deported back to square zero. On the other hand one’s kismet may prove to 
be more favourable: by dint of hard work and all sorts of lucky breaks, someone with an 
identical background may make a fortune. But whilst no migrant can hope to get far in the 
absence of fortitude, flexibility, inventiveness and willingness to carry on no matter how 
serious the obstacles, there is one further vital resource which can play a vital role in keeping 
misfortune at bay: membership of a vigorously articulated trans-jurisdictional network.  
 
However a further feature of settlers’ success-stories is that any progress which they makes – 
whether achieved on an individual or a collective basis – will invariably be perceived as 
having a transgressive impact on the interests, concerns and expectations of more established 
components of the local population. This is particularly so when recession sets in, and/or 
when their efforts have led to substantial material success. In such circumstances migrants, as 
wells as their locally born offspring regularly find themselves faced with jealous hostility, 
and targeted as convenient scapegoats for all manner of ills for which they have no 
responsibility whatsoever.  
 
It is also worth noting that such tensions between ‘natives’ and ‘interlopers’ regularly occur 
in contexts of all kinds, regardless of whether the settlers in question descend hegemonically 
from above or erupt transgressively from below. Nevertheless the outcomes differ sharply in 
each case. Those who descend from above are usually significantly wealthier than the 
indigenes, and in any event are invariably in a position to legitimate their activities by calling 
upon the resources of their own preferred legal systems – a strategy routinely deployed by 
European colonists during their many exercises in diasporic expansion. By contrast no such 
options are available to their contemporary counterparts who have recently established a 
similar presence in Euro-America. From this perspective they are colonists who dare not 
speak their name, given that all efforts to organise their lives on their own preferred terms are 
promptly perceived as efforts to subvert the established order. Roles have been 
comprehensively reversed: now it is the natives who are the hegemons, the settlers the 
transgressive interlopers. However despite this reversal the terms of the ideological debate 
used to defend the resultant boundaries has remained largely unchanged: having been given 
an appropriate retread, the arguments which missionaries and evangelical administrators 
developed to legitimise their ‘civilising mission’ in the sub-continent during the late 
nineteenth are being rolled out once again in contemporary Britain, this time as a convenient 
means whereby the natives can rubbish the preferred personal and domestic lifestyles of the 
settlers as backward, uncivilised and oppressive. Moreover just as in nineteenth century, such 
perspectives are steadily being formalised in law, as progressively minded legislators have 
begun to take to take advantage every opportunity to render ‘unacceptable’ aspects of 
minority lifestyles as illicit, illegitimate and even criminal (Ballard 2009).  
 
This brings me to the final stage in my argument. Whilst contemporary migrants’ utilisation 
of the resources of their own indigenous cultural capital has been no less crucial to their 
entrepreneurial success than it was to their Euro-American diasporic predecessors, the natives 
have in this case taken advantage of their position of hegemony to attacking the worth, and 
indeed the very legitimacy, of the settlers’ most effective capital resource: their capacity to 
draw creatively on the resources of cultural, conceptual, linguistic and religious alterity. As a 
result all manifest signs that the settlers are utilising such strategies readily attract the charge 
‘You don’t belong’, which carries an unspoken sub-text that those who order their behaviour 
on such an unacceptable basis have no legitimate place in the wider whole. 
 
In such circumstances contemporary ethnic colonists have every reason to keep their heads 
down in the course of encounters with the natives, and to protest that they are doing nothing 
of the sort, thus strategically concealing their personal and domestic alterity. This has in turn 
made space for the construction of currently fashionable policies of community cohesion, 
whose basic premise is that members of migrant minorities cannot expect, and certainly do 
not deserve, to gain wholehearted social acceptance so long as they fail to adopt the cultural 
and social conventions of the indigenous majority. Such a strategy begs a crucial question. Is 
community cohesion a project which offers the best means of advancing the interests of 
members of such minority groups, as its proponents insist? Or is it, to the contrary, a 
seductively labelled strategy which simply urges those who to bind themselves still further 
into the assumptions of majoritarian hegemony, so yet further undermining their capacity to 
resist its hypocritical embrace? Moreover there is yet a further dimension to this hall of 
mirrors. For whose ears are policies of ‘community cohesion’ designed? Could it be that their 
principal objective is not so much to change the behaviour of the settlers and their offspring, 
or rather to convince the increasingly unsettled natives that something is being done to 
contain the growing salience of ethnic plurality?   
The contemporary dialectics of border control  
Looked at as the outcome of a dialectic process transgression and resistance operating over 
the longue durée, no less so in global than in more local contexts, the current state of play 
should not be a cause for surprise; and precisely because the underlying disjunctions are 
political in character, it follows that moral arguments – no matter how elaborately honed – 
are most unlikely to provide a means of resolving the underlying contradictions. Both sides 
are equally capable of generating arguments by means of which to convince themselves of 
the righteousness of their own position, and of the unreasonable and illegitimate character of 
the arguments deployed by their opponents. In these circumstances the only viable analytical 
approach on the basis which to understand what is going on is one which seeks to tease out 
the premises, and the accompanying strategic moves, which those on either side have 
deployed as they have sought to defend and advance their contrary interests. An exploration 
of the contemporary politics of ‘border security’ serves to highlight the dialectics of these 
processes with particular clarity 
 
During the course of the past century, and most especially in the years that have passed since 
9/11, border security has become an increasingly pressing concern of most national 
jurisdictions, and most especially those in the developed world. This stands in sharp 
contradiction with developments associated with other dimensions of globalisation, which 
have led to progressive elimination of virtually all barriers to the movement of information, 
goods and capital across such jurisdictional boundaries. However precisely the opposite 
change has occurred with respect the mobility of people – or to be more precise, to the 
movement of people whose passports indicate that they are affiliated to the wrong state 
(almost always located in the South), and/or whose capital assets are insufficient for them to 
be hustled through a loophole open only to the exceptionally wealthy. Moreover if passports 
are now a taken-for-granted prerequisite for international trans-jurisdictional travel, they are 
in fact a relatively novel invention, whose use did not become widespread until after the first 
global War.  
 
Why should this be so? In previous eras Kingdoms and Empires invariably welcomed the 
prospect of population growth: more subjects generated more economic activity, which in 
turn produced a higher return to the state in the form of taxes. Moreover the formal 
incorporation of subjects into the Imperial order – as happened in India in the aftermath of the 
counter-hegemonic uprising against British domination in 1857 – was frequently deployed as 
a means whereby hegemonic interlopers could cast a cloak of legitimacy over their status of 
their overseas possessions. Hence one of the central elevation of Queen Victoria to the status 
of Empress in the aftermath of the violently-suppressed insurrection was to provided her 
newly incorporated British-Indian subjects with the right to roam as they wished through the 
length and breadth of her domain. Although this fit of imperial generosity may have been 
regarded as a purely nominal issue in the middle nineteenth century, it was not without its 
consequences. By the turn of the century the Governments of Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand began to take steps to exclude British subjects of Indian origin from their shores; and 
the issue became severely embarrassing to Her Majesty’s metropolitan Government in the 
middle of the following century later when what was perceived as an unwelcome flood of 
‘New Commonwealth Citizens’ began to take advantage of their status as subjects of the 
Crown to fill come to Britain to fill the gaps in the burgeoning post-war labour market.  
 
The result was a long succession of Commonwealth Immigration Acts which began by 
progressively reducing the rights of overseas-born British subjects to gain speedy access to 
UK citizenship, and eventually eliminated them altogether. One result of all this is that UK 
citizenship laws are not concerned, as is normally the case in republican contexts, of setting 
out the civil rights of citizens vis-à-vis the state. Instead they have a much narrower focus: 
they are concerned with establish who is, and above all who is not, entitled to enter Britain 
without the explicit permission of the Secretary of State. Since 9/11 Border Security has 
become a major industry, in which those charged with policing Britain’s borders have been 
granted unprecedentedly draconian powers.  
Border control and the construction of criminal offences 
Nevertheless the task of maintaining border security has become exceedingly tricky. In the 
first place the flow of persons, goods and capital across jurisdictional borders is now so huge 
that picking out ‘the bad guys’ – together with their goods and assets – has become a matter 
of searching for needles in haystacks. Secondly, the task of spotting such needles is rendered 
all the more challenging since a large number of people with identical ethnic characteristics 
to those whom the border controllers have been tasked to exclude have now gained rights of 
citizenship within jurisdiction whose boundaries they have been instructed to defend – which 
has rendered the challenge of distinguishing legitimate sheep from illegitimate goats yet more 
difficult still.  
 
Not that this has significantly inhibited efforts to detect and exclude the goats: popular 
demands for action remain far too strong for democratically elected authorities to admit 
defeat. As policy makers soon began to appreciate, bringing the inflow of unwanted settlers 
was a far more complex than turning off a tap. Given the analysis presented here, it is easy to 
see why: what they were up against were migrants’ own thriving self-constructed 
transnational networks, amongst whose central purposes was the facilitation of the trans-
jurisdictional circulation of ideas, assets – and, of course, network members themselves.   
 
Although it would be idle to suggest that migration managers as yet appreciate fully 
appreciate the scale and sophistication of the Hydra which they have taken on. Given that 
English law prescribe the use of explicitly racist measures, the central thrust of the initiatives 
soon began to focus on the strategies which those riding escalators of chain migration were 
using to subvert (and from the migration managers’ perspective, to transgress) the established 
system of border controls; and to the extent that those strategies were largely grounded in the 
articulation of reciprocities of kinship and marriage, it has been on precisely these issues 
which immigration control measures have become ever more tightly focused (Brejal 2006, 
Hagelund 2008, Ballard 2008). In a further reprise of the trend noted earlier, efforts to 
discredit entrepreneurially inspired efforts to subvert the exclusionary border controls 
deliberately erected in their path have begun to focus ever more heavily on the alleged moral 
inadequacy – and hence the inherent illegitimacy – of the network-builders preferred 
conceptual and behavioural norms.  
Terrorists and Money Launderers? 
Radically increased levels of border security have by no means solely directed at containing 
the level of would-be settlers across them: most especially in the aftermath of 9/11 an equal 
amount of attention has been directed towards scrutinising two further dimension of their 
trans-jurisdictional networks, namely the flow of information through them, and even more 
importantly the way in which they were consequently being used to facilitate the circulation 
of financial value on a global basis. This had major institutional consequences. Border 
control came to be regarded as a matter of national security, with the result that specialist 
agencies – the Department of Homeland Security in the United States, and the Serious and 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in the UK were set up to guard them. In both cases one of 
their principle tasks was cut the sinews of the trans-jurisdictional networks on which 
terrorists, drugs-smugglers and the participants in other forms of organised crime were 
believed to utilise to facilitate their nefarious activities. 
 
But just how were such criminals and their activities to be identified? The first step was to 
use a process of elimination. So far as I am aware neither SOCA nor the Department of 
Homeland Security have ever taken any significant interest in the way in which the major 
international banks and their legal advisers facilitated the kind of activities described by 
Baker and Brittain-Catlin: namely the trans-jurisdictional transfer of billions of dollars into 
translegal space, so rendering it safe from the prying eyes of tax inspectors and other 
nationally rooted busy-bodies. Instead they have focused their attention on their informal 
counterparts emerging from below, and most especially (although by no means exclusively) 
those of an identifiably Muslim character. However both SOCA and Homeland Security were 
still faced with the problem of picking out the criminals whom they were tasked to catch: 
unfortunately they remained as elusive as ever to those legally confined to the use of 
network-inspection methodologies6. Their principal response in the midst of all this was to 
target the networks themselves, and then to charge those involved with what can best be 
described as surrogate crimes. Of these two have been particularly widely utilised and 
publicised: ‘people smuggling’ and ‘money-laundering’ – issues which take us straight back 
to the macroscopic issues sketched out at the beginning of this article.  
 
                                                 
6  Despite the excesses that took place in Guantanamo Bay and its archipelago of translegal rendition 
centres, there are strong indications that the CIA and MI6 have been much more successful terrorist-
catchers than either the Department of Homeland Security or SOCA.  
But just what did these offences involve? Charges of ‘people smuggling’ were not directed at 
illegitimate border crossers themselves (they were simply deported to some conveniently 
distant location), but rather at those who facilitated the border-crossers’ efforts to reach their 
goal. But just what was their goal? The answer, given the analysis I have presented here, was 
simply to extract themselves for conditions of comprehensive marginalisation in the deep 
South, and to take their place in the wide open spaces to be found at the bottom of the labour 
market in the prosperous North. Moreover they were prepared to pay the facilitators 
substantial sums – more often than not loaned by kinsfolk who had already established 
themselves on the far side of the border. But just what was criminal about such activities? 
Viewed from above, the answer is straightforward: ‘people smugglers’ are engaged in a 
conspiracy to breach the structures which serve to defend condition of material privilege 
enjoyed by the inhabitants of the global north. But viewed from the South they emerge in a 
very different life. As far as entrepreneurially minded migrants are concerned such ‘people 
smugglers’ provide a public service, since they facilitate their efforts to press their way 
upwards and outwards through a structurally unequal global order. From that perspective 
‘people smugglers’ are committing the criminal offence of facilitating upward socio-
economic mobility.  
However these initiatives did not halt at people smuggling. Even more effort has been put 
into targeting the ability of trust-based trans-jurisdictional networks to facilitate the 
circulation of financial value on a global basis with a minimum of fuss or cost. Virtually all 
long-distance migrants have developed such IVTS (Informal Value Transfer System) as a 
means of facilitating the speedy and efficient transfer a substantial proportion of their 
overseas earnings to their kinsfolk back home. Whilst IVTS systems vary a great deal in their 
size and sophistication, those which have emerged in the Indian Ocean region, where their 
operators have been built on the foundations of ancient hawala/hundi system, have achieved 
a spectacular level of success. From a hub of major Exchange Houses in Dubai, networks 
operating on this basis operate what amounts to a global payments system through which the 
value associated with the remittances sent by millions of labour migrants Saudi Arabia, the 
Gulf, Western Europe and North America to their kinsfolk in South Asia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and so forth are used to facilitate back-to-back swaps which generate hard-
currency liquidity with which to settle all manner of commercial transfers in the Indian Ocean 
region on a multi-billion dollar basis (Ballard in press, 2006, 2005).  
 
However in the aftermath of 9/11 this highly successful example of globalisation from below 
promptly became the focus of intense suspicion, on the grounds that there was every prospect 
that those responsible for the outrage must have been funded through this shadowy system of 
‘underground banking’. Indeed within weeks of the attack the US treasury used its hegemonic 
position with the global financial system to engineer the closure of the Somali based al-
Barakat network on the grounds that that those involved fulfilled the role of “quartermasters 
of terror” – although it subsequently transpired that funds to support the attack on the twin 
towers were actually transmitted through accounts held in the Florida-based Suntrust Bank.  
However this was merely a one-off. By contrast a much more focussed and institutionally 
grounded effort to eliminate  these ‘shadowy networks’ was included in the USA PATRIOT 
Act, whose full title was Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, passed into law only six weeks after 9/11. A 
key component of the Act was a requirement that all financial operations which had anything 
to with the US banking system should comply with the requirements of US-sponsored (Anti-
Money Laundering and Counter the Financing of Terrorism) initiatives. AML/CFT can only 
be described as a blunderbuss which had, and was designed to have, global consequences. 
 
The key to the success of this initiative was just a consequence of the fact that the USA had 
for some time been the world’s largest economy, but also that the US dollar had become the 
de facto global medium of exchange. The consequences of this were, and still are, far-
reaching. Besides placing the New York Fed in the happy position of being able to print 
unlimited supplies of greenbacks, it also follows that banks located in all other financial 
jurisdictions use corresponding accounts with Wall Street banks to facilitate all their forex 
settlements. All this gave the US authorities an immense amount of power over the global 
financial system, of which the provisions of the Patriot Act sought to make the most: in 
addition requiring all US banks to comply with the requirements of AML/CFT, along with 
the additional recommendations of FinCEN (the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 
another brainchild of the US Treasury), it also required all overseas financial institutions who 
maintained corresponding accounts to comply with them as well if they wished to keep 
trading. The aim of these initiatives was quite clear: to establish border controls within the 
global financial order in such a way that all trans-jurisdictional financial transactions which 
through the compliant formal banking system could be deemed legitimate and above board, 
whilst all those passing through other channels – such as IVTS networks – could be deemed 
illicit and in all probability criminal. It followed that the Patriot Act was not just aimed at 
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida, as supporters of these draconian measures routinely suggest: 
rather it sought to cut the financial sinews of all those making ordered transgressive 
challenges to America’s global interests and financed their activities. ‘Homeland Security’, in 
other words.  
 
In other words the nominal target of the Patriot Act was terrorists and drug smugglers, the 
actual impact of AML/CFT regulations has gone far beyond these publicly announced goals. 
Indeed whether by accident of design, the new measures appear to have had very little impact 
on those whose activities the initiatives were nominally designed to curb. The scale of 
international drugs smuggling continues to grow, and there is no evidence that AML/CFT 
provisions have significantly hindered undermined terrorist activity. When terrorists and 
drugs smugglers have been caught, it is invariably a result of careful detective work focused 
on the targets themselves. That does not mean, however, that the new regulatory regime has 
had no impact whatsoever. As Passos (2006) argues in a well-informed article entitled 
Fighting terror with error: the counter-productive regulation of informal value transfers, the 
consequent targeting of such informal networks inherently criminal, have had far-reaching 
and largely negative consequences for long distance labour migrants. Arguing that the US 
authorities have engaged in ‘fact free policy making’, and that none of the many raids on 
Hawala operators made by ICE had resulted in terrorist charges, he goes on to conclude that 
The sad point is that clearly underserved ethnic communities are now de facto deemed 
undeserving of access to indispensable financial services. The decision over who is and who 
is not to have such access is delegated to the private sector, including banks eager to 
participate in the massive immigrant remittance market and not troubled if some of the 
competition is eliminated. 
 
From this perspective it is clear that developments in the financial sector mirror those found 
elsewhere. Just as a border controls now operate as a carefully structured sieve through which 
the globally privileged can pass without significant let or hindrance, whilst unwelcome 
interlopers from below are systematically excluded, so similar measures have been put in 
train in the world of finance. So it is whilst formally incorporated businesses and high net 
wealth individuals with direct access to the facilities of SWIFT can whisk multi-million 
dollar tranches of value around the globe with the click of a mouse, lesser mortals seeking to 
transfer sums of a few tens of thousands of dollars or less find themselves having either to 
pay the substantial fees commissions charged by formally incorporated financial  institutions 
for implementing forex transfers, or to use swifter, cheaper and just as reliable services 
available in the informal sector – in the hope that their funds will not be impounded by the 
authorities somewhere along the way  on the grounds that they are part and parcel of a 
process of criminally-inspired money-laundering.  
Conclusion 
Trans-jurisdictional networks are an increasingly salient feature of the contemporary world, 
since they provide the institutional foundations of all forms of globalisation. Although all 
such networks serve similar purposes – namely to facilitate the circulation of persons, of 
assets and of information across jurisdictional boundaries – they are articulated in a wide 
variety of formats. The vectors of diversity which I have highlighted in this article are 
twofold: firstly as between those networks which are articulated on a formal contractual 
basis, as opposed to those which rely on more informal relationships of mutual reciprocity, 
often articulated in terms of kinship or quasi-kinship as a means of articulating their internal 
structure; and secondly as between those articulate those articulate from above as opposed to 
those articulated ‘from below’. From this perspective the vast majority of contemporary 
South Asian diasporic networks are internally ordered on an informal rather than an informal 
basis, and have been articulated from below, rather than from above.  
 
The is no reason to suppose that the processes set in train by the emergence of a multiplicity 
of such networks, whether they articulated from above or below, or a formal or an informal 
basis have zero sum consequences. Ever since the publication of Adam Smith’s Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, economists have accepted that free trade 
across jurisdictional boundaries ultimately brings benefits to both parties to the transaction. 
But however true that may be in the long run, in the shorter run the free movement of goods 
and labour may well have deleterious consequences for some parties, especially when they 
find the livelihoods to which they have grown accustomed are in danger of being undercut by 
alien competitors who can fill the niche they have hitherto to occupied more cheaply and 
efficiently than they can themselves. It is in these circumstances that the strategies which 
economists identify as irrational protectionism begin to rear their heads. 
 
Such irrational protectionism is a phenomenon familiar to every member of South Asia’s 
many diasporic networks. They are likely to encounter it whenever they cross a jurisdictional 
boundary, and whenever they utilise their own informal channels to do business with one 
another. But whilst these diasporic networks have been growing exponentially in scale over 
recent years, as have the wider processes of globalisation, there is little sign that these 
protectionist responses have been declining in strength. On the contrary the events of 9/11 
provided the world’s greatest hegemon with an opportunity of which it could not afford to 
fail to take advantage. From that perspective the intense concern with matters of national 
security which erupted in the aftermath of the collapse of the twin towers provided the US 
authorities with a long-awaited opportunity to launch the Patriot Act, and hence to introduce 
a battery of measures (many of which were ready and waiting on the shelf) who objectives 
were deliberately discriminatory in character, and which could now be justified on the basis 
of National Security. Protectionism ceased to be irrational: it was now inscribed in law. 
 
But even though the resultant measures were inscribed in law, they still had to be legally 
justified. How was this to be achieved? So far as can be seen it was done along two vectors. 
Firstly by recourse to notions of national sovereignty, and most especially to the premise that 
sovereign states have an absolute right to determine who is, and who is not a citizen, and to 
control the flow of aliens across their borders. It is for this reason that as the global south has 
become steadily more competitive, and hence more transgressive of the taken for granted 
privileges of the global north, passport and visa regimes have become steadily more salient. 
However the second component of the strategy has been more subtle – and also a great deal 
more wide ranging. By refusing to accord legitimacy to informally constituted networks, such 
that they can readily be labelled as presumptively criminal, initiates which nominally 
designed to cut the financial sinews of drugs-smugglers and terrorists threaten – at least in 
principle – to have just the same effect on the channels of informal reciprocity on which 
virtually all of South Asia’s diasporic networks rely to sustain themselves.  
 
But how far are these measures likely to bring success – in the sense of keeping the 
transgressors at bay? Viewed from the longue durée, such an outcome seems unlikely in the 
extreme, given that: 
• these developments are part and parcel of the wider tectonic shifts as a result of which 
the centre of gravity of global wealth and power is shifting steadily from west to east 
• despite the current recession, there are no signs  that the demand for those willing to 
fulfil menial tasks at the bottom of the labour market will disappear 
• entrepreneurially minded migrants such as those from South Asia routinely regard 
menial employment as a step towards better things, if not for themselves, then 
certainly for their children 
• despite the efforts of border controllers, the trans-jurisdictional networks of 
reciprocity maintained by members of well-established ethnic colonies continue to 
facilitate further inward migration 
• in the light of the collapse of the speculative pyramids precipitated by untrammelled 
contractual individualism, it is no longer self-evident that financial networks 
underpinned by formal contractual and credit-driven procedures are inherently 
superior to, let alone more stable than, those which rely on relationships of culturally 
grounded mutual trust to provide a foundation on which to implement entrepreneurial 
edifices.  
All this raises major – and currently unanswerable – questions about future developments. 
With such considerations in mind, it is worth remembering that the currently conventional 
differential evaluation of the merits of ‘formal’ as opposed to ‘informal’ modes of trans-
jurisdictional networking have little anything to do with the equally conventional contrast 
between innovative and hence financially efficient ‘modernity’ and slow-moving and hence 
non-entrepreneurial ‘tradition’. Indeed in the midst of current developments in globalisation, 
there is a growing body of evidence that both theses are mistaken. 
 
In the mist of the implosion of the hitherto hegemonic Euro-American banking system, it is 
clear that however innovative the formal structures erected by clever financial engineers may 
have been, in the medium term they turned out to be no more stable than any other Ponzi 
scheme. By contrast those systems less affected by ‘irrational exuberance’ – or in other words 
those allegedly locked into allegedly slow-moving and non-entrepreneurial ‘tradition’ – have 
not only weathered the storm in much better shape, but also as Euro-America’s creditors. In 
these circumstances it is not so much that formal systems are necessarily more efficient than 
those erected on less contractual foundations. It is simply that in Euro-American jurisdictions 
contractually grounded entrepreneurial initiatives, the vast majority of which are currently 
hegemonically articulated from above, are routinely viewed as licit, whilst more the 
‘informal’ initiatives which emerge counter-hegemonically from below. But having identified 
the empirical source of the injunction it is also worth noting the specific character of the legal 
foundations on which this whole edifice has been erected. 
 
As Brittain-Caitlin demonstrates in great and illuminating detail in his examination of the 
operation of the offshore banking industry, the key to the whole edifice derives from the 
capacity for the controllers of companies (who are ultimately real persons) to incorporate the 
edifices they have erected in such a way as to give them autonomous legal personalities. 
Whilst this enables such corporate entities to do business as if they were real persons, the fact 
that they are legal fictions has far reaching consequences. They have none of the duties and 
responsibilities of real persons, can be fitted inside one another like Chinese boxes, and made 
to appear and disappear, and/or to relocate themselves as an when it suits their controllers. As 
such they are ideal entities within which to operate in trans-jurisdictional space: because least 
they have autonomous legal personalities transactions within the corporation can legitimately 
be designated as private, and hence of no concern to outsiders – including agents of any given 
jurisdictional entity. It follow that whilst multinational corporations are consequently free to 
operate on trans-jurisdictionally, and hence a trans-legally, on an entirely legitimate basis – to 
immense strategic advantage. In other words corporations can readily engage in activities 
which would be classed as illicit conspiracies if implemented within unincorporated networks 
such as those which characteristically emerge in diasporic contexts.  
 
It is for precisely this reason that ‘informal’ networks – in other words those which are 
ordered in terms of relationships of mutual reciprocity rather than of formal legal contracts – 
find themselves so vulnerable in a world where relationships of contract, rather than 
reciprocity, occupy a position of legal dominance, and are hegemonically enforced. But for 
how much longer can this last? It is often noted that Marx’ prediction that capitalism would 
‘collapse under the weight of its own contradictions’ failed to materialise, either in the 
nineteenth century with which he was familiar, or in the twentieth century which followed. 
But Marx had no inkling of the novel forms of globalisation which would emerge towards the 
end of the millenium, or that the irrational exuberance of Euro-American financiers would 
lead them to construct of contractually grounded shadow economy many times greater in size 
than the global GDP.  Now that their Ponzi scheme has collapsed in chaos, there seems to be 
a very real prospect that Marx’ prediction may well come true – at least with respect to the 
current iteration of Euro-American capitalism.  
 
But as the centre of gravity of economic and entrepreneurial activity shifts steadily back from 
west to east, it would be idle to presume the prospective collapse of Euro-American 
hegemony will necessarily be conterminous with the collapse of the global economy as a 
whole. Nemesis for any given imperial structure does not necessarily spell nemesis for the 
world as a whole. At present few of the beneficiaries of several centuries of hegemonic 
privilege appear to be aware of the fragility of their current position, let alone of the extent to 
which the transgressive successes of those who are busily are undermining their positions of 
privilege doing so much by slavishly copying their dominators’ ideas and practices, but rather 
by picking and choosing between them whist also adding a huge dash of masala based on the 
creative utilisation of the resources of their own distinctive cultural heritages – all the better 
to outflank and confound their former hubristic hegemons.  
 
Diaspora-construction is part and parcel of this process. Moreover it is in many respects the 
last frontier in the development of globalisation. The latter part of twentieth century 
witnessed the ever greater penetration of all national jurisdictions by inflows of goods, of 
services – and of course of capital – emanating from extra-jurisdictional resources. ; and 
however much the indigenes in any given jurisdiction may be hostile to the pluralising 
consequence of the growth of diasporic inflows from below, there appears to be no greater 
prospect of their being able to halt these developments than did wise old King Canute when 
he showed that his followers than no matter great his regal powers might be, he was in no 
position to halt the rising tide. Despite the current global tendency to intensify the salience of 
jurisdictional boundaries as a means reinforcing national integrity – a phenomenon which is 
just as manifest as between the sub-continent’s jurisdictions as it is elsewhere – we live in a 
plural universe. In such a world all hegemonic efforts to enforce uniformity can only be 
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